I. INTRODUCTION
The literature on private ordering examines how parties use extralegal means-most commonly reputational sanctions-to enforce contracts. As described by Barak D. Richman, private ordering "compares the efficiencies of private (extralegal) contract enforcement with the more traditional use of public law and state-run courts." 1 A series of studies by Lisa Bernstein illustrates a paradigm case of private ordering -trade associations that use industry arbitrators (private judges) to adjudicate disputes, with the arbitrators' awards typically enforced by the threat of extralegal sanctions such as expulsion from the association. 2 In the trade associations studied by Bernstein, the merchants opted out of the public court system and instead chose to have their disputes resolved by private judges applying industry trade rules.
With its focus on private legal systems, the private ordering literature sets up a seeming dichotomy between public court adjudication of disputes, applying publicly created laws, and private arbitral adjudication of disputes, applying privately developed rules. Trade association arbitrations fit neatly into the latter category; 3 public courts fit almost as neatly into the former. But while the dichotomy highlights the cases of most interest in the private ordering literature, it is too simple. It gives the appearance of an all-or-nothing choice-all public dispute resolution or all private dispute resolution-when in fact hybrid choices are common.
This article seeks to add to the private ordering literature in two ways. First, it argues in Part II that international commercial arbitration, while sometimes cited as an example of private ordering, is in fact-a hybrid case-with important elements of public involvement supplementing the use of a private decision maker. International commercial arbitration, as distinguished from trade association arbitration, is nonspecialized arbitration between private parties involved in international commercial transactions. 4 In the overwhelming number of cases, parties to international arbitration agreements reject the option of having their dispute resolved under privately developed commercial rules, the so-called new Law Merchant or lex mercatoria. Instead, they choose to have their dispute resolved under publicly created laws. 5 Moreover, unlike parties in trade association arbitrations, parties in international commercial arbitrations often turn to the courts for aid in enforcing awards. 6 Too often, international arbitration is grouped with trade association arbitration in ways that blur the important distinctions between the two. Not all arbitration is alike, and not all parties that agree to arbitrate opt out of the legal system altogether.
Second, in Part III, this article examines attributes of international transactions that help explain party choice among these different mechanisms of resolving disputes. It considers four attributes: (1) distance-geographic, as well as cultural and political-between the parties; (2) the complexity of the good or service; (3) the clarity of the applicable national law; and (4) the importance of speedy resolution of disputes. Trade association arbitration is most likely to be used for transactions in simple goods, although less likely in international transactions involving greater distances than domestic transactions. International commercial arbitration is the more likely choice for international transactions, except in cases in which the applicable law is clear or emergency relief is likely to be needed. In such cases, parties are more likely to choose litigation in national courts. The attributes thus prove useful in explaining differences in the choice of enforcement mechanism across various types of international transactions. Whether they are as useful in explaining variation among businesses engaged in similar transactions awaits further work. Public courts, with judges selected and hired by the government, make decisions based on statutory or common law enforced by the government. By comparison, a private legal system is "a non-governmental institution intended to regulate the behavior of its members." 10 The paradigm example of a private legal system is trade association arbitration, as discussed in the next section.
II. PRIVATE ORDERING AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

11
As others have noted, 12 treating the choice as dichotomousbetween public courts and wholly private legal systems-is an oversimplification. Expanding the choice to two dimensions illustrates several hybrid possibilities, as Table 1 illustrates. The horizontal dimension is the decision maker 13 -either public or private-while the vertical dimension is the source of the rules applied by the decision maker-again, either public or private.
14 The public courts are in the upper left corner of the table, with a public decision maker, the judge, applying publicly created rules-codes, statutes, or common law rules. The lower right hand corner of the table defines private legal systems, such as trade association arbitration-with private decision makers applying privately created rules. The other two corners identify hybrid the 'make-or-buy question')." Richman, supra note 1, at 2329. Vertically integrated firms have internalized the dispute resolution process and have no need to establish or participate in a private legal system for those disputes. 12. E.g., Aviram, supra note 10, at 4 n.3 ("Though usually discernable, the dichotomy between public and private legal systems is not always a clear one. Some PLSs have a significant public backing and are very similar to public legal systems. . . . Conversely, some public legal fora defer to private ordering (e.g., arbitration proceedings), and some public legal fora compete with other legal fora, and thus act more like PLSs.").
13. Of course, "[n]ot all systems of private law have private judges or arbitrators." Richman, supra note 1, at 2339 n.33. My focus here is on those that do.
14. Further dimensions could be added-such as the extent of private versus public enforcement of decisions.
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cases-with public decision makers applying privately created rules and private decision makers applying publicly created rules. The next two sections of this article examine in more detail trade association arbitration and international commercial arbitration for purposes of considering the extent to which they are properly characterized as private legal systems.
A. Trade Association Arbitration
The paradigm case of private ordering is trade association arbitration of the sort studied by Lisa Bernstein. 16 According to Bernstein, "[p]rivate commercial law exists in over fifty industries, including diamonds, grain, feed, independent films, printing, binding, peanuts, rice, cotton, burlap, rubber, hay and tea." 17 Although the details of the arbitration systems vary, 18 some commonalities emerge. First, the decision maker is a private party, not a state employee-usually an employee of a company in the industry. 19 Second, in resolving disputes, the arbitrators commonly apply codified industry trade rules rather than 15 20 Third, arbitration awards are typically enforced through extralegal sanctions, such as publicity or threat of expulsion from the trade association.
21
Only rarely do parties go to court to enforce awards in trade association arbitrations.
Notably, not all trade associations resolve disputes through private legal systems. 22 Eric A. Feldman has described dispute resolution among Japanese merchants participating in the tuna auction at the Tokyo Central Wholesale Market. 23 Unlike the merchants studied by Bernstein, the Tokyo tuna merchants resolve disputes in a government-sponsored, albeit highly specialized, court. 24 As Feldman explains, "The Tuna Court thus defies predictions that members of close-knit merchant groups will reject formal, public courts and laws in favor of informal group norms. Instead, formal law-bound procedures play a central role in the interactions of tuna traders and govern their management of disputes." 25 Thus, even among trade associations-the paradigm case of private ordering-not all dispute resolution systems are alike, and not all parties opt for private legal systems.
B. International Commercial Arbitration and the New Law Merchant
International commercial arbitration-as the source of the "new Law Merchant" or lex mercatoria-also is identified as an example of a private legal system. 26 21. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 2, at 108 ("In most industries, however, it is rarely necessary for a party to seek judicial enforcement of an award. Merchant tribunals are able to place their own pressures on the parties to comply promptly with their decisions."); Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 2, at 1737-38 (concluding it "is rarely necessary" to seek enforcement of awards in court; instead threat of expulsion is "usually sufficient to induce merchants to promptly comply with arbitration decisions unless they are bankrupt or in severe financial distress"); Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note 2, at 129 ("In practice, however, it is rarely necessary for a party to a [New York Diamond Dealers Club] arbitration to seek confirmation of a judgment.").
22. Suffice it to say that the plethora of scholarly writings on the subject would not appear to have been matched by an equivalent interest on the part of international operators when choosing the law to govern their contractual relations, or international arbitrators when deciding on the rules to apply to the merits of a case in the absence of a choice by the parties.
34
I have summarized the evidence in detail elsewhere, 35 and will highlight a few key points here. First, as 37. Drahozal, supra note 35, at 536-44; Dasser, supra note 35, at 139-41 ("The final tally of references to a lex mercatoria [in clauses giving rise to ICC arbitrations] is somewhere between 12 and 15 cases, i.e., approximately 0.3%"). Thus, the evidence appears inconsistent with Alec Stone Sweet's assertion that "the Lex Mercatoria is increasingly being selected as the controlling law in contracts by traders and arbitrators." parties in a sample of joint venture agreements contracted for application of "general international commercial practices," in virtually all of those cases the new Law Merchant applied only when there was no "published and publicly available" national law on point. 38 In other words, the new Law Merchant applied only in the absence of national law, not in lieu of national law. Third, arbitration awards appear "only rarely" to rely on the lex mercatoria instead of national law. 39 Thus, international arbitration largely is a procedural substitute for national courts; international arbitrators generally apply national law, not some autonomous body of private commercial law. Moreover, extralegal sanctions are not the exclusive means by which international arbitration awards are enforced. While it appears that most international arbitration awards are complied with voluntarily, 41 the available empirical evidence suggests that public courts nonetheless play an important role in the process. Naimark and Keer studied a sample of American Arbitration Association international arbitration awards and found the following:
42
• Of 205 cases studied, 100 awards had been fully or partially complied with, 35 were not complied with, and 51 cases were unresolved and pending in a court action. In another 18 cases, the claimant lost the case.
43
• Of the 100 awards that had been complied with, "26 respondents attributed compliance to negotiation after the award, 61 attributed compliance to voluntary action by the parties after the award, 12 attributed compliance to court ordered enforcement, and one attributed compliance to a letter demand for compliance sent after the award."
44
• "The data also show that 67 of the awards were confirmed by a court and one was confirmed with some alteration of the terms of the award." Those 67 awards presumably included the 12 with court-ordered enforcement, plus "some of the 26 cases renegotiated, as well as some of the 61 cases voluntarily complied with." 45 Although the results are not definitive, and the data are limited to international arbitrations administered by a single institution, they 41 
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nonetheless suggest that parties use the courts to assist in collecting international arbitration awards in a sizable number of cases.
46
Based on the available empirical evidence, then, international commercial arbitration cannot fairly be described as a private legal system that operates like the trade association arbitrations studied by Bernstein. Parties only rarely contract for application of privately created commercial law, and courts appear to play an important role in the enforcement of international arbitration awards.
III. ATTRIBUTES OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CHOICE AMONG CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
This part offers some comments on party choice among various mechanisms for enforcing international contracts. In other words, when do parties opt out of the public legal system for a private legal system, such as trade association arbitration, and when do they choose instead international commercial arbitration or litigation in the national courts? It first identifies key attributes of international transactions and then uses those attributes to help explain party choice among these alternative contract enforcement methods.
47
A. Attributes of International Commercial Transactions
Several attributes of international transactions help explain and predict party choice among means of contract enforcement. 48 Obviously the attributes discussed below are interrelated, and the list is not 46 . As Naimark and Keer put it, "[t]he sample seems to show arbitration in a partnership with the courts in a good number of cases, given the awards that were confirmed into judgments by the court." Id. at 274.
47. In addition, parties might vertically integrate and internalize the dispute resolution function. Richman, supra note 1, at 2330. For simplicity's sake, I do not consider this other alternative here.
48. Id. at 2338 ("the nature of the underlying transaction will consistently determine the superior method of enforcement"); Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 277 (1991) ("The discriminating alignment hypothesis to which transaction-cost economics owes much of its predictive content holds that transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way."); see also exclusive. 49 Nonetheless, the attributes provide at least a starting point for analysis.
Distance Among Parties
By distance among the parties, I mean not only strict geographic distance, i.e., how far apart the parties are, but also cultural distance, i.e., how culturally homogeneous the parties are, and political distance, i.e., whether the legal systems of the countries in which the parties are located are similar. 50 Distance is important in choice of enforcement mechanism for several reasons. Increased geographical distance makes reputational sanctions less effective. Information flows less readily and repeat dealings are less common. 51 Increased cultural distance may also reduce the effectiveness of reputational sanctions as well as the ability of parties to organize groups in the first place. 52 Increased political distance may affect the neutrality of the dispute resolution forum. A party may not be willing to subject itself to the court system of another party for fear of bias. 53 In addition, increased political distance may affect the legal enforceability of decisions of courts and arbitrators because the legal regime governing the enforceability of international arbitration awards differs from that governing foreign court judgments. 54 
Product or Service Complexity
Simple products are things like grain and natural resources. 55 Complex products are things with many characteristics, such as machinery or a power plant. 56 The complexity of the product or service matters for several reasons.
First, product complexity affects the frequency of party interactions and the amounts at stake in a dispute. Parties dealing with simpler products are likely to have more routine, repeat transactions and smaller amounts at stake in those transactions. Such parties will be better able to organize into trade associations and to use reputational sanctions to enforce contracts. 57 Second, complexity affects the difficulty of verifying performance under the contract and the degree of contract standardization. For complex products, contract performance may be more difficult to verify and contracts less standardized. 58 Even for simple products, and perhaps particularly for simple products, industry expert arbitrators may be able to verify performance when public court judges cannot. As Avinash Dixit explains:
Matters like the quantities and time of delivery of the component are recorded and easily verifiable; therefore a contract that specifies the firm's payment to the component supplier as a function of these matters can be written and enforced by the government's civil courts. But a specialized arbitrator may be able to verify more subtle aspects of quality and fit of the component; then a contract that conditions payment on such aspects may become feasible under arbitration. 59 Third, more complex transactions may provide more opportunities for renegotiation during performance. Thus, according to Oliver Williamson, "[t]he economics of governance treats simple market exchange as a special case and features ongoing transactions for which adaptations (of both spontaneous and intentional kinds) are needed." 60 57. See Aviram, supra note 10, at 25 ("A reader familiar with antitrust scholarship may notice the similarity between these criteria and the criteria that facilitate collusion among firms. This is no coincidence, as cartels exhibit one form of behavior regulation: they discipline firms to maintain their prices and outputs at a level maximizing the collective's profits. A cartel fails if it is unable to enforce its mandates-the same enforcement problem that other, socially beneficial PLSs face."). Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 298 (7th ed. 2007) (listing "homogeneity of product" as factor increasing likelihood of collusion in market).
58. Berkovitz et al., supra note 55, at 169 ("The simpler and more standardized the type of product, the more complete the contract and the easier verification of breach of contract."). Legal uncertainty obviously is a broad concept and could apply to any number of characteristics of a transaction. 61 This article emphasizes the clarity of the publicly created law, including common law as developed by the courts. If the publicly-created law is clear, parties may prefer to have any dispute, particularly disputes likely to involve relatively undisputed facts, resolved by the public courts. 62 In such a case, the expertise of arbitrators will be of relatively little value, while the limited court review of arbitration awards would mean that any error by the arbitrator is likely to go uncorrected. 
Costs of Delay in Resolving Disputes
How critical is fast action in resolving a dispute? For perishable goods, fast action can be critical in determining whether the goods conformed to the contract. 64 Moreover, for goods sold in bulk, returning defective products is impractical and monetary allowances must be made instead. 65 In such cases, the advantage of expert industry arbitrators, as transactions, arbitration also provides a forum with greater give-and-take, which promotes cooperation, continuity, and mutual gains. 63. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2009); Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854) ("If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside, either in law or fact.").
64. DEREK KIRBY JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ARBITRATION 3 (1991) ("In the case of cocoa beans, the arbitrators each take a handful of beans and cut them in half with a knife to assess the internal mould, insect damage, 'slateyness' and other defects which their trained eyes detect. For rice, each arbitrator takes a handful of up to 50 grains and physically counts how many are broken, chipped, black or coloured, compared with the total, and thus arrives at the percentage of defective grains."); Derek Kirby Johnson, Commodity Trade Arbitration, in HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE 267, 273-74 (Ronald Bernstein ed., 3d ed. 1998) (Commodity trade arbitrations "are based on the original 'look-sniff' arbitrations for quality and/or condition which were and are such an important feature of commodity trading.").
65. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ARBITRATION, supra note 64, at 2 (explaining that for international commodity transactions, "returning the goods is impractical"); Johnson, Commodity Trade Arbitration, supra note 64, at 274 ("Goods shipped in bulk from far off origins could not be sent back if they were not to the liking of the buyer, so each trade quickly developed a system of experts in each commodity who could say whether or not goods were as required by the contract, or, if not, in what respect they fell short, and what should be the measure of damages.").
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in trade association arbitrations, is substantial. For some more complex contracts, such as merger agreements, immediate action, such as the grant of a temporary restraining order, can be essential for effective dispute resolution. 66 Courts are best suited to act without delay in such cases. The arbitrators must be appointed before they can grant interim relief, by which point the benefits of emergency relief may be lost.
67
B. Choice Among Enforcement Mechanisms: Trade Association Arbitration, International Commercial Arbitration, or Litigation in National Courts
Examining these attributes of international commercial transactions provides insights into party choice of the mechanism for dispute resolution. The three options considered here are trade association arbitration, international commercial arbitration, and litigation in national courts.
Trade Association Arbitration
As a general matter, one would expect trade association arbitration to be most prevalent for simple goods. Such goods are more likely to involve repeat transactions, enhancing party ability to organize and the value of reputational sanctions. The informational advantages and speed of decision-making of industry expert arbitrators likewise are most pronounced in such cases.
The empirical record is consistent with these predictions. Trade association arbitrations in fact are most common for simple goods or services-typically, although not exclusively, commodities such as food stuffs and metals. 68 In trade association arbitrations, disputes typically Because international transactions involve greater distances, both geographically and culturally, trade association arbitration is likely to be less common for international transactions than for domestic ones. Reputational enforcement mechanisms will be less effective because of fewer repeat dealings and more costly transmission of information. Moreover, groups will be less homogenous, again making organization and enforcement more difficult.
Empirical evidence appears to bear out the supposition that trade association arbitration is less common in international transactions. As Berkowitz et al. found:
There are numerous trade associations specializing in different product categories. Most international trade associations, however, do not offer quasi-legal services.
We surveyed eighty-two international trade associations, but found only three that offered dispute resolution to their members, GAFTA, the Coca Association of London, and the Liverpool Cotton Association. 72 Moreover, among the international trade associations that have arbitration systems, reputational enforcement systems are less effective. According to Berkowitz et al., rather than relying on expulsion or 69. Bernstein, Merchant Law (NGFA), supra note 2, at 1817 ("grain and feed transactions are so standardized that the facts of any particular case are likely to be close to the archetypical transaction contemplated by the drafters of the trade rules").
70. To illustrate, the largest NGFA award studied by Bernstein was for $138,000. Bernstein, Merchant Law (NGFA), supra note 2, at 1817 (from years [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Although the amount at stake in NGFA arbitrations is larger in more recent years, it remains relatively small. A review of NGFA arbitration awards from 2007 finds one award in which the claimant sought $1.7 million and recovered $1.1 million (with the arbitrators rejecting a counterclaim for $458,000) and one in which the claimant recovered $1.3 million, but otherwise no claim larger than $500,000 and a number of claims for less than $50,000. ew international commodities exchanges have active arbitration tribunals that resolve disputes among buyers and sellers of such commodities. They typically offer such services to their own members or to brokers: not, however, to the ultimate buyers and sellers of the commodities traded on the exchange."); Johnson, Commodity Trade Arbitration, supra note 64, at 268 ("There are in the very nature of things a wide variety of commodities, and therefore a very large number of trade associations to promote the interests of those particular trades. However, not all of the trades represented by associations in the United Kingdom have provisions for arbitration and of those that do, there are some whose facilities are little used.").
blacklisting, GAFTA "refers disputes over the arbitration awards to English courts." 73 Other international trade associations, such as the international cotton trade associations, maintain lists of firms that do not comply with arbitration awards. But those trade associations have struggled with enforcing their arbitration awards, and now appear to be seeking greater governmental involvement in award enforcement. 74 
International Commercial Arbitration
Greater distances will tend to favor international commercial arbitration over trade association arbitration for the converse of the reasons stated above. Longer distances make information transmission more difficult and reduce the likelihood of repeat business. 75 Distanceof the political sort-also provides key advantages for international commercial arbitration over litigation in national courts. Parties may prefer not to litigate in the home courts of the other party to the contract, and, in many cases, international treaties make international arbitration awards more enforceable than foreign court judgments. 76 Further, international commercial arbitration is more likely to be used for complex products than for simple products: complex products involve fewer repeat dealings and less advantage of industry expertise. Again, the empirical reality is consistent with these predictions. In international commercial arbitration, disputes often arise out of nonstandardized transactions with very high stakes. 77 Moreover, international commercial arbitrators tend to be generalists, rather than PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:4 industry experts. 78 Even so, they may have more industry expertise than public court judges. 79 
National Court Litigation
So when will parties use litigation rather than arbitration in international transactions? The above transaction attributes suggest that clarity of national law is an important factor in party choice of national courts, along with the greater availability of emergency relief. 80 The available empirical evidence is consistent with the foregoing suppositions. Eisenberg and Miller examined a sample of "material" contracts filed with the SEC and found only 20.6% of the international contracts included arbitration clauses. 81 Consistent with the importance of distance, that percentage was more than double the percentage of domestic U.S. contracts with arbitration clauses. 82 But that percentage is still well below some estimates in the international arbitration literature. 83 An important reason is the type of contracts involved in the Eisenberg and Miller sample. Those contracts-typically involving corporate transactions or commercial financing-are ones in which national law, at least U.S. national law, is relatively clear. Also important is the need for emergency relief in disputes arising out of corporate mergers and similar transactions, a remedy for which arbitration is not well suited.
84
IV. CONCLUSION Both trade association arbitration and international commercial arbitration often are cited as examples of private ordering. But international commercial arbitration differs in important ways from trade association arbitration. Parties to international commercial arbitration agreements typically do not contract for application of privately created law (the new Law Merchant or lex mercatoria); instead, in the substantial majority of cases they agree to the application of national law. Moreover, courts play an important role in the enforcement of international arbitration awards, even in cases in which the parties "voluntarily" comply with awards. In short, not all arbitration is alike, and international commercial arbitration more correctly should be seen as a hybrid case and not a purely private legal system. Several attributes of international transactions are important in understanding party choice among these and other methods of resolving disputes. Parties dealing in simple, as opposed to complex, products and services are more likely to form trade associations and use trade clause.") (citing ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, ARBITRAGERECHT 134 (1988) ). Gary Born addresses such estimates as follows:
This [ 90%] figure lacks empirical support and is almost certainly substantially inflated: in reality, significant numbers of international commercial transactions-certainly much more than 10% of all contracts-contain either forum selection clauses or no dispute resolution provision at all. It is probably true that, in negotiated commercial (not financial) transactions, where parties devote attention to the issue of dispute resolution, and where the parties possess comparable bargaining power, arbitration clauses are more likely than not to be encountered. This remains a highly impressive endorsement of arbitration, and permits one to fairly say that international arbitration is the preferred means for contractual dispute resolution, but more ambitious statistical claims are unsustainable. BORN, supra note 53, at 71.
84. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 49. Another factor that is important at least in domestic cases is whether the dispute has very high stakes-i.e., whether it is a so-called "bet the company" case. See Center for Public Resources, ADR Suitability Screen, item 5 (1998) (discouraging use of arbitration when "a vital corporate interest or 'bet the company' case [is] involved that requires the full panoply of procedural protection afforded by court and full appeal rights"). That factor seems to be less important in international transactions, as shown by the very high stakes in some international arbitrations, see supra note 77, presumably because of concerns about home court bias and enforceability of awards.
